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Sexual Stereotyping
in Promotion
Practices Violates
Title VII
The Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse Case

By Clifford E. Hutton, Michael J. Tucker, and Sheila M. Bradley

In Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse1 the
United States District Court for the
District of Columbia recently found a
major public accounting firm guilty of
sex discrimination when it refused to
promote a woman manager to partner.
Only fifteen months earlier, the
Supreme Court of the United States in
Hishon v. King & Spalding2 held that
promotion to partnership in a law firm
was subject to Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964—the first applica
tion of Title VII to a professional part
nership.3 The Hishon and Hopkins
decisions place the whole selection
process for admission into an account
ing firm partnership as it relates to the
admission of minority candidates
under intense judicial scrutiny.

Hopkins v. Price
Waterhouse
In 1982, Ann Hopkins, the plaintiff,
a female accountant and senior
manager, was proposed for partner
ship in Price Waterhouse by her office,
the Office of Government Services
(OGS), a division of Price Waterhouse.
Of the 88 candidates for partnership
that year, plaintiff was the only
woman. At that time all of the OGS
partners were men, and by July 1984
there were only seven women among

the 662 partners at Price Waterhouse.
The Court noted plaintiff’s suc
cessful career as a senior manager
and her significant role in developing
business for the firm. None of the
other partnership candidates com
peting that year had a comparable
record in terms of successfully secur
ing major contracts for the partner
ship. The record indicated that clients
were very pleased with the plaintiff’s
work and that she had no difficulty
dealing with them. Her proposal for
partnership was fully endorsed by the
partners in the OGS office. Price
Waterhouse admitted that based upon
technical qualifications the plaintiff’s
fitness to become a partner was never
in doubt.
In its partnership selection process,
Price Waterhouse asks all the part
ners to not only rank candidates on an
exhaustive list of relevant, neutral
criteria, but to make one of three
recommendations: (1) for admission,
(2) deny admission, or (3) hold for fur
ther consideration, and to comment on
their appraisal. Of the 32 partners who
submitted evaluations concerning the
plaintiff, 13 recommended admission,
8 denial, 3 hold, and 8 had insufficient
basis for opinion. Many commentators
felt that Ms. Hopkins had problems

dealing with fellow employees. These
comments indicated the plaintiff had
particular difficulty dealing with lower
ranking staff members of the firm.
Both supporters and opponents in
dicated the plaintiff “was sometimes
overly aggressive, unduly harsh, dif
ficult to work with and impatient with
the staff.’’4 Because of the number of
negative comments by both sup
porters and opponents, along with the
significant number of no votes, most
by partners who had had limited con
tact with the candidate, the Admission
Committee decided to recommend
that the plaintiff’s admission to the
partnership should be held at least a
year in order to afford her time to
demonstrate the personal and leader
ship qualities required of a partner.
To improve her chances of making
partner next year, and at the urging of
her senior partner, the plaintiff under
went a Quality Control Review with
favorable results. This was a process
by which the plaintiff was given
pointers to help repair any deficiencies
prior to the time she was reviewed for
partner again. Several partners also
stated that they planned to give her
opportunities to demonstrate her
abilities, but apparently never follow
ed through. Just four months after the
Policy Board’s recommendation that
she should be held for a year, the part
ners in OGS decided not to repropose
the plaintiff for partnership because
two partners in the OGS office now
strongly opposed her candidacy.
When Price Waterhouse advised
the plaintiff of this decision, and of the
unlikelihood of admission to partner
ship, she chose to resign in January,
1984, rather than try again for admis
sion into the partnership or remain as
a senior manager as proposed by the
defendant. The plaintiff filed suit alleg
ing sex discrimination in violation of Ti
tle VII, and asked the Court to order
that she be made partner and to

Firms may not inject
stereotyped assumptions
about women into the selec
tion process for partnership.
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award back pay and other monetary
relief.

Plaintiff’s Argument
The plaintiff argued that the deci
sion was discriminatory because (1)
the criticisms of plaintiff’s interper
sonal skills were inaccurate and un
true; (2) even if Price Waterhouse
believed her personal skills were defi
cient, the partnership routinely admit
ted male candidates having problems
with interpersonal skills if they had
strong qualifications in other areas; (3)
Price Waterhouse’s critique of the
plaintiff’s interpersonal skills was a
result of sexual stereotyping by male
partners. The firm’s partnership selec
tion process improperly gave full
weight to these discriminatory evalua
tions. Price Waterhouse denied each
of the allegations and claimed that the
plaintiff was properly denied partner
ship because the firm, for legitimate
business reasons, avoids admitting
abrasive partners who might jeopar
dize morale and who were incapable
of effectively supervising staff
members.
The Court noted that Ms. Hopkins’
inability to get along with staff
members or peers is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for refusing to
admit her to the partnership. The
Court accepted as accurate that the
complaints about the plaintiff’s in
terpersonal skills were not fabricated
or a pretext for discrimination. The
Court acknowledged the plaintiff was
a hard-driving manager who pushed
her staff and occasionally used pro
fanity, but was not persuaded that
such conduct was relevant to this
inquiry.
In considering the plaintiff’s allega
tions, the Court examined the records
generated by the partnership selection
at Price Waterhouse for 1982, 1983,
and 1984. The Court found that Price
Waterhouse had legitimate, non-dis
criminatory reasons for distinguishing
between the plaintiff and the male
partners with whom she was com
peting, and that the firm’s emphasis
on negative comments, did not, by
itself, result in any discriminatory treat
ment. The practice of giving great
weight to “no” votes was applied in
the same way to male and female can
didates. Statistics submitted by the
plaintiff showing the small number of
women partners at Price Waterhouse
and the lower selection rate of women
4/The Woman CPA, July, 1986

The plaintiff claimed she was
a victim of sexual
stereotyping.

for partnership were found to be in
conclusive because of insufficient
data or lack of statistical significance.

Major Focus on Sexual
Stereotyping
The major focus of this case was the
plaintiff’s third argument: that she was
a victim of sexual stereotyping, and
that discriminatory evaluations were
improperly used by defendant in the
partnership selection process. The
plaintiff claimed that she was not eval
uated as a manager, but as a “woman
manager,” because those who evalu
ated her used sexual stereotypes that
prompt men to regard assertive be
havior in women as being more offen
sive and intolerable than comparable
behavior in men.
Some of the comments noted in
cluded: “she may have overcompen
sated for being a woman,” suggesting
she “take a course at a charm
school,” came across as “macho,”
focusing on her profanity “because
it’s a lady using foul language.” Her
strongest supporter, the head partner
at OGS, was responsible for telling her
what problems she needed to over
come with her candidacy, and he ad
vised her to “walk more femininely,
talk more femininely, dress more
femininely, wear makeup, have her
hair styled, and wear jewelry.”5
The Court analyzed the comments
made about other women candidates
for admission to the Price Waterhouse
partnership and found these com
ments supported the inference that
the partnership evaluation process
used by Price Waterhouse was affect
ed by sexual stereotyping. The Court
felt that Price Waterhouse did nothing
to discourage sexually biased evalua
tions. The Court used as an example
of this negligence the comments of a
partner who repeatedly said he could
never consider a woman seriously for
partner and did not think a woman was
capable of being a senior manager.

Apparently the court felt that Price
Waterhouse never acted to discour
age such comments, and that this
recommendation was given equal
consideration with other partner’s
comments.
The Court took note of the testimony
of plaintiff’s expert witness on stereo
typing, and held that stereotyping
played an undefined role in blocking
plaintiff’s admission to the partnership
in this instance. The evidence indi
cated that the partner’s stereotyping
behavior though not conscious was
nonetheless efficacious in blocking
the plaintiff’s admission to partner
ship. Prior case law required proof of
discriminatory motive or purpose to
establish a claim of disparate treat
ment based on subjective evalua
tions.6 Under these prior holdings
Price Waterhouse could not be found
guilty of discrimination since any sex
ual bias in its promotions process was
unconscious. The District Court held
however that the use of a system that
gave weight to such biased criticism
was a conscious act of the partnership
as a whole. Furthermore, they indi
cated that Price Waterhouse should
have been aware that women might
well be victims of discriminatory ster
eotypes when being evaluated by
male partners. The firm made no ef
fort to investigate or address this
issue. A general policy statement of
equal employment opportunities for all
minorities issued by Price Waterhouse
in 1983 was not considered a signifi
cant attempt since it did not address
the special concerns of discrimination
against women in an overwhelmingly
male partnership.

The Court’s Findings
The Court found that although firms
are free to use subjective evaluations
as criteria in selecting employees for
partners, they are not free to inject
stereotyped assumptions about
women into the selection process. The
firm’s failure to take the steps
necessary to alert partners to the
possibility that their judgments may be
biased, to discourage stereotyping,
and to investigate and discard, where
appropriate, comments that suggest a
promotion and evaluation policy con
stitutes a violation of Title VII. The
Court noted the presence of three
factors which working in combination
produced the Title VII violation: 1)
comments influenced by sex stereo

types were made by partners, 2) Price
Waterhouse’s evaluation process
gave substantial weight to such com
ments, 3) Price Waterhouse failed to
address the conspicuous problem of
stereotyping in its partnership evalua
tions. While these three factors might
have been mitigatory in denying plain
tiff admission to the partnership when
taken separately, when acting in con
cert, they produced Ms. Hopkins' re
jection as a partner. The Court found
the Policy Board’s decision not to ad
mit the plaintiff to partnership was
tainted by discriminatory evaluations
that were the direct result of its failure
to address the evident problem of sex
ual stereotyping in partners’
evaluations.
Acknowledging the plaintiff might
still not have been elected to partner
ship without the stereotyped evalua
tions, the Court stated that once
discrimination has been proved, the
burden of proof is on the employer to
prove that the decision would have
been the same, and that Price Water
house did not present that proof.
Therefore the defendant was found
guilty of sex discrimination.
Because the plaintiff had voluntarily
resigned, and was unable to prove
constructive discharge, the Court
denied her request for an order that
she be made a partner. Because the
parties agreed privately to defer con
sideration of backpay until after the
issue of liability was resolved without
the knowledge or consent of the
Court, the Court found that it could not
consider that issue, and awarded on
ly attorney fees to the plaintiff.

Conclusion
Title VII requires affirmative action
to root out discriminatory promotion
standards, not just neutrality or a lack
of discrimination. The Court’s focus on
Price Waterhouse’s selection process
in Hopkins showed that the choice of
neutral criteria in the evaluation pro
cess is not sufficient, the criteria must
be used neutrally. In repeatedly citing
the defendant for failure to recognize
and act upon obvious bias, the Court
demonstrated that a company has a
positive responsibility to prevent such
bias in its employment practices. The
Court did not find a general statement
of a policy of equal opportunity at all
adequate, but indicated a need for a
policy that addressed the specific con
cerns of women.

It is apparent the Courts are seek
ing, and will be satisfied with no less
than a comprehensive program to en
sure that minorities are treated equally
in the entire employment process.
This will require more than reacting to
evidence of bias, and the education of
personnel to the existence of stereo
typing and its consequences. Com
panies will need to assess whether in
their training practices, selection of
assignments, etc., minorities are not
penalized by outmoded perceptions.
An often unconsciously held notion
about women is that pregnancy
means resignation or that women will
leave after a few years of marriage.
Several surveys have shown,
however, that women change jobs for
the same reasons as men—profes
sional, work-related considerations.7
“Client resistance’’ to women is
another widespread perception with
which the Courts may have little pa
tience, and may find that the company
has a duty to provide their women
employees with at least equal expo
sure to clients, and even with educa
tional programs structured to make up
for a lack of such experience.
Public accounting firms may need
to look to the experience of firms like
Merck which “has a program that
identified 10 percent of its women and
10 percent of minorities as ‘most pro
mising.’ The company prepares a writ
ten agenda of what it will take for them
to move up to the next level. Progress
upward may mean changing jobs or
switching functions, so Merck cir
culates their credentials throughout
the company. ‘We have a timetable
and we track these women careful
ly,’...Since 1979 almost 40 percent of
the net growth in Merck’s managerial
staff has been women.’’8
Support and encouragement by
management is crucial in retaining
talented employees of both sexes.

Firms may use subjective
evaluations as criteria in
selecting employees for
partners.

Perceived prejudice of any accounting
firm against women may encourage
women to look elsewhere for oppor
tunities to use their talents. All the
traditionally male dominated profes
sions are having to adapt, often reluc
tantly, to the growing presence of
women.
These issues have implications for
minorities other than women, who
might argue that neutral standards
may be misused by white males who
unconsciously rely upon stereotypes
when making promotion decisions.
There is no doubt that neutrality in ap
plying promotion standards will be es
sential in avoiding costly lawsuits and
the loss of valued professionals. Ω
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